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Übungen zur Mikroökonomie
In: Pearson Studium
In: Wi - Wirtschaft
In: wi - vwl/mikroökonomie
A Report on the Late-Breaking Events Panel
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 96, S. 354-357
ISSN: 2169-1118
Judicial review and the power of the executive and legislative branches
In: Research in economics: Ricerche economiche, Band 71, Heft 1, S. 67-85
ISSN: 1090-9451
Optimal income taxation and the ability distribution: implications for migration equilibria
As recently argued by Diamond [1998], one of the key factors explaining the progressivity of an optimal non-linear income tax is the distribution of productivity among workers. Migration is one source of changes in the productivity distribution. How changes in the population's ability distribution affect optimal income tax schedules has received little attention. Changing the distribution generally changes both the objective function and the government budget constraint. We first consider the comparative statics of the fraction of highly-skilled workers with a Rawlsian welfare function (so that only the second effect is present) and a quasi-linear utility function. We perform the same analysis for a despotic social welfare function, and present some results for a utilitarian social welfare function. We study the interaction between mobility and redistributive taxation. We consider mobility by either the skilled or unskilled population in both Rawlsian and majority voting frameworks where governments take the population as fixed. Our main result is that equal ability distributions across jurisdictions is a stable equilibrium when the unskilled are mobile, but only under certain conditions when the skilled are mobile.
BASE
Optimal income taxation and the ability distribution: implications for migration equilibria
As recently argued by Diamond [1998], one of the key factors explaining the progressivity of an optimal non-linear income tax is the distribution of productivity among workers. Migration is one source of changes in the productivity distribution. How changes in the population's ability distribution affect optimal income tax schedules has received little attention. Changing the distribution generally changes both the objective function and the government budget constraint. We first consider the comparative statics of the fraction of highly-skilled workers with a Rawlsian welfare function (so that only the second effect is present) and a quasi-linear utility function. We perform the same analysis for a despotic social welfare function, and present some results for a utilitarian social welfare function. We study the interaction between mobility and redistributive taxation. We consider mobility by either the skilled or unskilled population in both Rawlsian and majority voting frameworks where governments take the population as fixed. Our main result is that equal ability distributions across jurisdictions is a stable equilibrium when the unskilled are mobile, but only under certain conditions when the skilled are mobile.
BASE
Equilibrium assignments in pairwise team contests: How to form political slates and tennis teams
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 101-114